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Abstract
Workers’ compensation law in the United States is derived from European models of social insurance introduced
in Germany and in England. These two concepts of workers’ compensation are found today in the federal and
state workers’ compensation programs in the United States. All reform proposals in the United States are
influenced by the European experience with workers’ compensation. In 2006, a reform proposal termed the
Public Health Model was made that would abolish the workers’ compensation system, and in its place adopt a
national disability insurance system for all injuries and illnesses. In the public health model, health and safety
professionals would work primarily in public health agencies. The public health model eliminates the physician
from any role other than that of privately consulting with the patient and offering advice solely to the patient.
The Public Health Model is strongly influenced by the European success with physician consultation with
industry and labor.
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Background
Workers’ compensation law in the United States is
derived from European social insurance. It has evolved
at the federal and state levels over the past century
through a long series of reform (or redesign) initiatives.
There have been many hundreds of minor redesigns
implemented by the state programs, the net result of
which is a workers’ compensation system that fails to
provide the required benefits to workers. Recent reform
initiatives in United States draw heavily on European
workers’ compensation systems, yet the European model
does not offer the possibility of reform that is more
than a continuation of the redesign process.
The European Model
Workers’ compensation is a European concept, dating
back to German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck. By the
turn of the 20th century, all European countries had
workers’ compensation laws. The German law required
employees to pay part of the costs and called for highly
centralized administration. Its coverage was broad, was
compulsory, and provided for nonprofit mutual
employers’ insurance funds [1]. Most industrialized
nations now have national workers’ compensation pro-
grams based on the German model [2].
The British law embodied a different approach. It was
elective, administration was left to the courts, and insur-
ance was carried through private firms. The German
system was closely linked to the rest of the social insur-
ance system. It provided for accident prevention, medi-
cal treatment, and rehabilitation, whereas the British
scheme did none of these things [3]. The British system
was troubled from the outset by disputes over which
jobs and what industries were to be covered, resulting in
the litigation that the system had been intended to
replace.
Workers’ Compensation in the United States
In the United States, two separate and unequal workers’
compensation systems, federal and state, function in
complete separation. The federal system, under the Fed-
eral Employees’ Compensation Act (FECA), was
designed and operated following the German model.
FECA covers 2.9 million federal employees in more than
70 different agencies along with a number of other
worker groups adopted by Congress in various acts of
expansion of the federal authority.
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FECA provides benefits without delay, and moves
disabled workers to other government programs in a
non-adversarial system. It provides social insurance
that most European countries would recognize as
equal to their own. The FECA program operates with-
out competition. The Secretary of Labor has exclusive
jurisdiction over the entire program, including the sev-
eral appeal and review processes. The Department of
Labor (DOL) has few constraints on what it charges
the federal agencies, passing on its costs plus, in some
cases, a fee based on a pro rata share of administrative
costs. Most federal agencies include workers’ compen-
sation costs in their annual appropriation requests to
Congress, which makes the costs difficult to discern
[4].
The United States, late in accepting workers’ compen-
sation, allowed the individual states to develop separate
and unequal programs. The state laws were influenced
much more by the English system than the German
one. Like the original English Poor Law, prevention of
poverty, not prevention of disability and its social man-
agement, was the driving concern for the development
of the state workers’ compensation programs [5]. The
medical profession was a major opponent of compulsory
social health insurance. The resulting fragmented work-
ers’ compensation arrangements now offered to most
workers in state plans bear little resemblance to the fed-
eral program.
The state workers’ compensation system has been
confrontational with workers throughout its history,
with benefits that are far from adequate. State pro-
grams pay for less than one third of the total costs of
occupational injuries and illnesses, shifting most of
these costs to the workers, their families, private medi-
cal insurance, and Medicare and Medicaid [6]. Ten
times as many severely disabled occupational disease
victims receive Social Security Disability Insurance
(SSDI) or early retirement benefits as receive workers’
compensation benefits [7]. Although the state pro-
grams may appear to approximate the FECA program,
there are major deficiencies in coverage and benefits
they offer.
Occupational injuries and illnesses, if accurately
reported, would be among the five leading causes of
morbidity and mortality in the United States [8]. These
injuries and diseases, along with their fatalities, result in
costs that are well over three times the published expen-
ditures, and roughly 3% of the U.S. gross domestic pro-
duct (GDP) [9]. Most of the costs of occupational
disease are not covered by workers’ compensation
[10,11]. Only about one in twenty severely disabled
occupational disease victims receives workers’ compen-
sation benefits. For occupational cancers, it is fewer
than one in a hundred.
Workers’ Compensation in Europe
In Europe, social democracies–a mixed system that bal-
ances market forces with government assistance–have
flourished since World War II. While the United States
devotes only 11 percent of its GDP to redistributing
income by way of social benefits, the countries of the
European Union contribute more than 26 percent [12].
In Europe, there is a tradition of strong labor political
organizations. With the EU’s large support bases for
workers’ compensation, reforms are not urgent necessi-
ties there as they are elsewhere. Nonetheless, significant
variations exist among EU countries. Social protection
represents more than 30% of the GDP in Sweden, Den-
mark, France, and Germany, yet less than 15% in the
Baltic countries.
The United Kingdom spends a much smaller propor-
tion of its GDP on occupational injury and disease bene-
fits than other European countries [13]. The new
Conservative government is instituting a program of
reassessing individuals receiving disability benefits.
Three fourths of those evaluated in the early stages of
the program have been found fit for work under new
evaluation guidelines [14].
The basic criteria of the workers’ compensation sys-
tems in European countries are similar. There are two
distinct approaches. The first is that of the German sys-
tem, with self-governed insurance associations funded
by employers’ contributions providing a comprehensive
prevention, rehabilitation, and compensation service. In
the second approach, the state administers the system
for compensating occupational injuries and disease as
part of its wider provision for social security and collects
from employers the sums necessary to finance it. Many
European countries now have mixtures of the state and
private insurance systems [13].
While fewer than half of American workers are cov-
ered by short-term disability insurance, all workers in
EU countries are covered against the risk of wage loss
due to temporary sickness through government agen-
cies. Wage-replacement schemes consist of social insur-
ance covering the loss of earnings due to old age,
unemployment, temporary sickness, or permanent dis-
ability. In all of the EU countries except The Nether-
lands, disability social security schemes are separated
from compensation for occupational injuries. Coverage
typically lasts up to a year, with transition to the longer-
term disability insurance programs if needed. In The
Netherlands, partially disabled unemployed workers are
given the same benefits as totally disabled workers [15].
This offers considerable advantage over the failed
attempts in the United States to deal with partial
disability.
The level of compensation has a profound influence
on utilization. In The Netherlands, the rate of disability
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in the working-age population is close to 9%, compared
with an average of 6% in other European countries.
Forty percent of persons with disabilities become long-
term unemployed [16]. In response, comprehensive
reforms have increased employer responsibilities over
the past decade, and now provide a more limited benefit
package. Employers are provided incentives to recruit
disabled workers in order to reintegrate them into the
work setting [15]. Emphasis is placed on returning
workers with injury and illness to acceptable jobs, and
on improving the work environment to prevent recur-
rence. Germany provides an example of the legally man-
dated role of the insurance organizations to provide
specific initiatives on rehabilitation, prevention, regula-
tion, and regulatory inspection. It is compulsory for
employers to adapt the working conditions and/or to
find a new work activity in the same company [17].
European countries have adopted lists of occupational
diseases that are typically appended to regulatory provi-
sions, thus ensuring the responsibility of the state. This
is a concept that has never taken hold in the United
States and is unlikely to be adopted. The roles of the
occupational disease lists in determining compensation
vary significantly. With the exception of Sweden, all EU
countries have a mix between a “closed” system with a
list including a certain number of diseases, and an
“open” system. In Sweden there is an open system in
which each claim for benefits is treated on its own mer-
its, where all illnesses that could possibly arise from
workplace exposures are considered. France has a more
pragmatic closed system and lists 112 occupational dis-
eases that require specific symptoms or pathological
lesions to be present, from work that is known to cause
the disease, and also specifies the time limits for com-
pensation claims. In other EU countries, the interpreta-
tion and the use of lists are within systems that contain
elements of both.
The cost of compensating occupational diseases
accounts for the majority of the total costs of compensa-
tion in European countries [15]. Workers’ compensation
systems in Europe continue to rely on physicians and
other experts to determine who receives benefits [16].
Determining the causes of occupational diseases involves
a review of epidemiological and other scientific and
medical evidence, and often the agreement of expert
consultants as to the increased risks resulting from the
occupational exposures. Significant differences exist in
the established and applied diagnostic and exposure cri-
teria in the EU countries [18]. There are differences
concerning the extents to which claimants must show
evidence of work exposure leading to disease. In Bel-
gium, Italy, and Luxembourg, there is a presumption of
cause. It is sufficient for victims to demonstrate that
they are suffering from listed diseases and that they
have been exposed to corresponding risks or that they
have done jobs specified by the lists. Similarly, in France,
the list of occupational diseases is considered to be a
presumption of cause. In Austria, Denmark, Finland,
Germany, Switzerland, Portugal, Spain, and Switzerland,
the lists serve merely as guides to insurance organiza-
tions investigating the claims. Insurers will seek to
establish whether a disease could have been caused by
an agent on the national list while at the same time
searching to find whether there are non-occupational
factors that could have caused it [13].
Reform Proposals in Europe
Reforms of workers’ compensation systems are being
considered in various European countries. The European
Commission’s Community Strategy on Health and
Safety at Work proposes to significantly reduce the inci-
dence rates of occupational injuries and illnesses by
2012. To achieve this, EU member countries must
implement health and safety regulations in national leg-
islation. Enforcement is essential, especially in small and
medium-sized enterprises, where member countries
must take direct measures to ensure compliance with
legislation, such as inspection and the issuing of penal-
ties [19,20].
Trade unions direct much of the discussion of reform,
alleging that most occupational diseases are still ignored
by the compensation systems, with under-reporting,
inadequate monitoring, and a resultant lack of compen-
sation. “Under-recognition of occupational diseases is
common to all EU countries. Its most immediate conse-
quence is a wholesale transfer of resources to the
employer’s benefit, with much of the cost burden being
shared between victims (loss of pay as a result of reas-
signment or firing), and general health budgets (social
security coverage of diseases, disability, and unemploy-
ment, national health system, etc.)” [21].
European countries share the concern that exclusion
of people with health problems or disabilities from the
labor market contributes to an increasing dependence
on health-related benefits. This in turn puts pressure on
the larger social protection system [15]. Even though EU
member countries have developed many of the most
successful workers’ compensation programs in the
world, the trade unions and other groups propose that
substantial reforms are needed. They emphasize that
• All occupational diseases should be recognized and
compensated as reliably as are occupational injuries.
Procedural reform is a clear priority throughout Eur-
ope to remedy the inefficiency of the mixed system.
Changes to the criteria that define occupational dis-
eases indirectly challenge the causal presumption
and should be removed from the existing schedules.
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Revision of schedules and recognition of new occu-
pational diseases should be enhanced. There must
be a shift in the onus of proof in light of epidemiolo-
gical evidence that some occupations involve major
risks of exposures to certain hazards and diseases.
• Prevention should be emphasized for chronic dis-
eases with delayed onsets, and diseases with long
latency periods such as occupational cancers. Health
surveillance must be more than just medical surveil-
lance. It must embrace surveillance of risks and
exposure, the latter being particularly critical for the
recognition of occupational cancers and other long-
latency diseases.
• Trade union participation should be expanded so
that trade unions are informed about companies
with unacceptable health and safety records. In
Spain, the campaigns of trade unions have led to the
establishment of regional safety representatives and
labor inspectors, bringing about needed improve-
ments in occupational health and safety.
• Perceived inadequacies in levels of compensation
available through social insurance combined with
perceptions of injustice over employer immunity
from redress under the civil law are leading to some
reorientation of national “no fault” compensation
systems towards a closer fit with civil law models.
• Criminal lawsuits should be reinstated where they
would have salutary effects on occupational health and
safety. Italy provides an example of a country where
the national legal service is actively involved in identi-
fying the occupational origins of diseases. Law officers
specialized in workplace health issues work in con-
junction with trade unions and victim support groups.
• The linking of occupational health and safety with
public health should be enhanced to focus public
health action on reducing social health inequities
caused by working conditions. A public health
approach to workplace health requires both political
and legal changes and an extension of the spheres of
preventive activities. It raises the issue of social con-
trol of the conditions of production to be consistent
with both human and environmental health. It brings
the concept of sustainability into the evaluation of
working conditions more than ever before [22].
• Compensation systems should be integrated into a
global health and safety strategy. The rapid rise in
occupational injuries and diseases in developing
countries cannot be ignored. The export of high-risk
activities to countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin
America is unacceptable. Global regulation is not
nearly sufficiently developed.
Many European reforms are moving in the direction
of economic incentives that reward organizations that
develop and maintain safe and healthful working envir-
onments. “European workers’compensation systems
always provide a combination of pure insurance func-
tions and government regulation. The weak point of
most of the compensation systems is, however, a lack of
simple correlation between preventive activities and
financial benefits” [23]. There are important differences
in the institutional assets, in the compensation of occu-
pational diseases, and in the kinds of incentives used in
different countries regardless of the social insurance sys-
tem. The fundamental difference between countries is
whether the workers’ compensation system is based on
a competitive market between private insurance compa-
nies or on a monopoly structure, where employers can-
not choose among insurance providers, Of the 27 EU
countries, 19 have monopoly systems. Subsidy systems,
tax incentives, and insurance-based “experience rating”
are theoretically possible in all EU countries [24]. The
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EU-
OSHA) concludes that “In competitive insurance mar-
kets, effort-based incentives are more difficult to
achieve. A possible solution could be the introduction of
long-term contracts or the creation of a common pre-
vention fund, financed equally by all insurers” [25].
Few countries outside Europe can attain such levels of
social progress. Nonetheless, the European model is fol-
lowed to varying degrees throughout the world. In many
developing countries, workers’ compensation is little
more than a paper program where the government
works in concert with industry to minimize the provi-
sion and costs of benefits [26,27]. The International
Labor Organization (ILO) Convention 121 (Employment
Injury Benefits Convention) is intended to ensure that
the occupationally injured and diseased workers in
member countries receive social security benefits that
conform to the ILO’s requirements for employment
injury benefits and medical care and sickness benefits.
To encourage countries to ratify the treaty, its require-
ments have a fairly low threshold. At present, only 24 of
183 member countries have ratified the treaty, including
only about half of the European countries [28].
Workers’ compensation reform is not widely consid-
ered outside Europe and North America. A notable
exception is New Zealand, which instituted a compre-
hensive accident insurance system in 1974. The New
Zealand no-fault system provides for compensation for
all victims of injury by accident, regardless of the cause
of the accident, eliminating tort remedies for such inju-
ries [29]. Under this system, emphasis is placed on acci-
dent prevention and, when necessary, on the
rehabilitation of injured persons. Tort litigation over
accidents has been almost entirely eliminated by statute.
Public hospitals provide medical treatment, and lump-
sum awards may be granted for permanent impairment.
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The New Zealand system offers timely compensation to
injured patients and shows evidence of effective com-
plaint resolution and provider accountability [30].
Reform Proposals in the United States
The legislative activity leading to the passage of the
Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHAct) raised
serious questions about the fairness and adequacy of the
state workers’ compensation programs. Congress found
the system to be in disarray, with low benefits, inade-
quate coverage and medical care, poor or no rehabilita-
tion, poor administration, and excessive litigation. While
the primary purpose of the OSHAct was to ensure uni-
formity in the application of safety and health regula-
tions, the Act also mandated the first steps toward
nationwide reform of the compensation systems. Yet,
after 40 years of experience with the OSHAct, there is
virtually no federal influence over the state workers’
compensation programs, despite the persistence of con-
siderable variation in administration and benefits.
The Federal Alternative
Many reformers contend that the state workers’ com-
pensation system should be discontinued in favor of a
national program with uniform coverage of health care
and wage-loss benefits. There have been few calls to fed-
eralize the state workers’ compensation systems in
recent years. The public debate does not appear to be
necessary. Most of the responsibility for compensating
disabled workers already resides in the federal govern-
ment, not in the state systems. The federal government
not only pays for most workers’ compensation benefits,
it operates its own array of programs that have consid-
erably more generous benefits than are offered by the
state programs [31]. Federal funding of workers’ com-
pensation is at least four times that of state programs
(See Table 1). The Social Security system is a major if
not the primary source for insurance for workplace
disabilities.
In quiet pursuit of the German model of European
workers’ compensation, Congress expands its authority
whenever pressed by worker groups that are not well
served by the state programs. The federalization of
workers’ compensation has been slowly unfolding, with
remarkably little discussion of the costs. The Longshore
and Harbor Workers Compensation Act was enacted in
1927, followed by the Black Lung Benefits Act, the
Radiation Exposure Compensation Act, the War
Hazards Compensation Act, and the Railroad Retire-
ment Act. These and many other compensation pro-
grams operate with permanent positions in the federal
government. The Energy Employees Occupational Ill-
ness Compensation Program Act of 2000, the newest of
these programs, provides compensation for employees
of the Department of Energy, its predecessor agencies,
and its contractors and subcontractors who become ill
as a result of the work performed in the production and
testing of nuclear weapons. The Department of Labor
has paid more than $6 billion in compensation and
medical benefits to more than 60,000 claimants in the
past nine years in just this one program [32].
FECA Reform Proposals
The FECA program is not viewed by legislators as being
in need of major reform. In that regard, its status is
similar to that of European workers’ compensation,
undergoing revisions but not requiring major reforms. A
number of reform proposals have been circulated by
FECA administrators and Inspectors General [33]. These
experts readily admit that FECA has serious structural
problems, that it creates disincentives to return to work,
and that the basic rate of FECA compensation often is
more than the employee’s pre-injury take-home pay.
One of the proposed reform measures calls for setting
disability compensation at 70% for all claimants, rather
than the current varied and higher rates allowed under
FECA. Another proposed FECA reform concerns the
equity issue inherent in the waiting-period provision.
The original purpose of a brief waiting period before
benefits were awarded was to discourage claims for
minor injuries and illnesses.
The most obvious problem in need of correction is
that current law gives long-term FECA claimants over
retirement age a choice between federal retirement sys-
tem benefits and FECA benefits. Most claimants choose
FECA benefits because they are more generous. A reco-
vering FECA claimant who goes back to work risks find-
ing that his or her retirement income will be less than if
he or she had stayed on FECA benefits. Although no
authority exists currently to reduce FECA benefits based
on age, two types of changes have been proposed to
reduce FECA benefits when employees reach an age
Table 1 U.S. Workers’ Compensation Costs, 2008, in billions.
State WC Programs Federal WC Programs Medicare/Medicaid SSDI
Cash benefits 28.1 29.8 109.0
Health care 26.1 25.0 63.6
Source: Sengupta I, Reno V, Burton JF, Jr: Workers’ Compensation: Benefits, Coverage, and Costs, 2008. Washington, DC: National Academy of Social Insurance; 2010
[43]. http://www.nasi.org/research/2010/report-workers-compensation-benefits-coverage-costs-2008.
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when retirement normally occurs. One proposed change
would convert FECA benefits to retirement benefits at
retirement age.
The Public Health Model
In 2006, I proposed the Public Health Model as a major
departure from the European models that have domi-
nated U.S. workers’ compensation. The Public Health
Model would abolish the entire workers’ compensation
system [34], replacing it with a comprehensive disability
insurance system for all injuries and illnesses. The
objective is to insure everyone equitably and to abolish
the government agencies that have failed to do this over
the past century. Industry and labor would deal directly
with government agencies to determine a national set of
benefits for injured or ill workers, with uniform incen-
tives to return to work. Wage replacement for workers
ought to be provided for a period of time stipulated by
government and consistent with other social programs.
The Public Health Model stipulated the following objec-
tives:
• The current federal and state workers’ compensa-
tion systems should be discontinued in favor of a
national program with uniform coverage of health
care and loss-of-earnings benefits. Workers in pri-
vate employment should receive the same benefits as
government workers.
• Resumption of tort liability should end exclusive
remedy and all other provisions of the various state
workers’ compensation programs.
• The replacement will be a no-fault compensation
system based on disability rather than cause, with an
integrated approach to disability compensation such
as exists in The Netherlands, where all employees
are covered by a compulsory scheme that insures
against loss of earnings resulting from long-term dis-
ability resulting from any injury or disease.
• There should be a national disability program simi-
lar to that in New Zealand to provide compensation
for all victims of injury by accident, regardless of the
cause of the accident. Disability should be defined
and benefits administered without the need for
health care professionals.
• Social Security (SSDI) disability benefits should be
provided for all permanent injuries and illnesses.
This uniform national coverage should provide an
income at a level to support a dignified standard of
living during disability.
• Health care should be provided by a national
health care system independent of industry involve-
ment and insurance industry control. Workers
should receive the same medical care under the
same conditions as all other citizens.
• Tort liability for negligence should be imposed on
those who knowingly cause disability. There should
be industry-wide shared liability for disability caused
by or connected to industry, and society-wide shared
liability for disability whose cause cannot be
identified.
Europeans see a considerable advantage in the direct
financing of workers’ compensation by employers. Eur-
opean employers are better organized and have more
societal power than workers’ organizations, yet are still
perceived to be protective of worker interests. Conse-
quently, Europeans hold that if all health care is
financed by a public budget, there will be less political
pressure from employers to keep the system efficient
and there could be less motivation for prevention.
Employers may put less effort in better working condi-
tions in order to avoid costs when workers’ compensa-
tion becomes a societal cost. Because of these concerns,
the proposed reforms in the United States are quite
unlike the established European models.
The Public Health Model would impose tort liability
for negligence on those who knowingly cause disability.
There would be industry-wide shared liability for dis-
ability caused by or connected to industry, and society-
wide shared liability for disability whose cause cannot be
identified. The European view of the United States
resuming tort liability is generally circumspect since
workers are in a weaker legal and economic position
than the employer. The U.S. experience is that workers
are already in a weak position with workers’ compensa-
tion and that tort liability will benefit workers. In Eur-
ope, there is political discussion of how to protect
workers (whistle blowers) who report obvious bad prac-
tices by their employers. Resumption of tort liability in
the United States would enhance the protections
afforded whistle blowers.
Abolishing the state workers’ compensation system
and the federal FECA program could result in signifi-
cant cost savings. The present system incurs high over-
head expenses providing benefits through programs
burdened with governmental bureaucracy, shared
administration by private insurance companies and
employers, and litigation. The public health model
would treat occupational diseases in the same way all
other disease is treated, removing them from the work-
ers’ compensation arena where causation must be
demonstrated, often leading to litigation.
The public health model requires that we move
beyond holding employers responsible for causing illness
and injury through the direct costs of medical care and
wage replacement. The public health model seeks to
advance prevention of occupational injuries and illnesses
through consultation provided by unbiased experts in
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health and safety. In doing so, the model adopts the
European experience of physician consultation with
industry [19,20,22]. France, Belgium, and Germany
employ physicians to conduct inspections of worksites
and examinations of employees. These physician consul-
tants provided by government are able to mandate
employer-financed occupational health services in many
of the larger plants [35]. A complete hazard survey for
every workplace in the country is conducted in Ger-
many, followed by health examinations of the workers,
and a plan for removal or control of hazards according
to the severity of risk [3,36].
Occupational health physicians working in corpora-
tions, as well as the companies that employ them, are
protected from malpractice liability by workers’ compen-
sation law. The “exclusive-remedy” provision of the law
is the quid pro quo under which the employer enjoys
immunity from being sued by workers for failing to be
responsible for worker health in exchange for accepting
financial liability for the workers’ injuries. This protec-
tion would end under the pubic health model.
Discussion
Workers’ compensation law places the occupational
physician in a critically important role. The physician
must determine that an injury or illness is caused by
work, diagnose the problem, prescribe care, and assess
the extent of impairment and the ability of the worker
to resume work. The common assumption is that physi-
cians can adequately assess the extent of disability that
results from occupational injury or illness. This is true
only for the minor injuries that have virtually no cost
impact on the workers’ compensation system. When the
injury is more severe, the physician’s estimate of the
extent of disability is far from satisfactory. Deborah
Stone has pointed out that “physicians have no particu-
lar skill, training, background, or information to perform
the task better than many other individuals. The failure
of the physician to provide a reliable service to the
worker under these circumstances results in a constant
need for dispute resolution through the judicial system”
[37]. Moreover, the physician’s success in returning
workers expeditiously to work diminishes rapidly with
the increasing severity of the injury or illness.
In the public health model physicians would no longer
act as gatekeepers for compensation benefits. The public
health model eliminates the physician from any role
other than that of privately consulting with the patient
and offering advice solely to the patient. Instead, health
and safety professionals would work primarily in public
health agencies, enhancing the physicians’ ability to
represent the workers, and to approach the work setting
not as employees but rather as advocates for health and
safety in the workplace. If companies ignored the
recommendations, regulatory agencies would intercede
with appropriate enforcement. In the event that pro-
blems persisted through lack of industry compliance,
the companies would be subject to litigation. Employers,
without the protection of exclusive remedy, will be leg-
ally liable for their disregard of occupational health and
safety. With the public health model, the costs asso-
ciated consultations and prevention ought to be far less
substantial than those inherent in the current system.
In many European countries, occupational medicine
specialists intervene at two levels: as labor inspectors
(provided by government and/or social security) and as
members of the company preventive services (at one
company, or in services covering many different compa-
nies). The latter are paid by employers. Inspection is
carried out by State labor inspectors; risk assessment
and health surveillance are carried out by company (or
inter-company) physicians. A complete hazard survey
for every workplace is compulsory in all the EU
countries.
The public health model may now be feasible as an
addition to the expanded healthcare coverage afforded
by the legislation passed in 2010. A historic opportunity
has been created for free choice of physicians by all
injured and ill workers. Workers would receive the same
health care any citizen would receive for similar injuries
and illnesses, making the current system of workers’
compensation health care redundant. Universal coverage
can reduce total spending by eliminating the high
administrative costs that are now necessary to determine
eligibility for coverage [38].
European systems interpret lists of occupational dis-
eases and compensate their victims appropriately. The
United States, and a few European countries such as
Finland, use a general clause or system of proof instead
of a list. This requires that for a disease to be recog-
nized as an occupational disease, a causal link to work
must be proven. Occupational diseases affect 15-20% of
Americans [8,39]. Conservative estimates are that 6-10%
of cancers, and 5-10% of myocardial infarctions, strokes,
and transient ischemia are caused by workplace factors.
Occupational neurological, psychological, renal, and
many other diseases are increasingly recognized [9].
Occupational diseases should be covered by workers’
compensation, but their costs are largely evaded by state
agencies and private insurers by amending state laws or
by cost shifting. The costs of fully compensating a sig-
nificant portion of heart disease, stroke, and cancer
cases alone would be far beyond the current scope of
workers’ compensation insurance coverage. The eventual
cost of an ever-expanding recognition of occupational
diseases will necessitate the transfer of this burden to
the mainstream of medical care where the determination
of causation will no longer be necessary to treatment.
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The determination of disability is increasingly viewed
as a lucrative medical business. Occupational physicians
have a political agenda to influence insurers to favor
their opinions over those of personal physicians [40].
Some states now require proof of the physician’s exper-
tise before testimony can be admitted in court cases.
Workers’ compensation medical care is much more
expensive than other medical care [41,42]. Medical pay-
ments increased by 8.8% in 2008, to $29.1 billion, now
for the first time accounting for over half of all workers’
compensation benefits [43]. It is argued that workers’
compensation medical care is delivered by physicians
who provide expensive medical treatment to accelerate
recovery and return to work, and that moreover, these
physicians often provide information that determines
income benefits, including whether an injury is compen-
sable when a worker is ready to return to work, and
assessments of permanent impairment [44].
These explanations of the extraordinary costs are not
well supported, and typically come from the professional
association that represents the business interests of its
members. A recent survey discovered that a small group
of physicians have a disproportionate effect on workers’
compensation claims. These cost-intensive physicians
made up 3.8% of physicians treating workers’ compensa-
tion cases, but accounted for 72% of costs. They treated
16 times more claimants, and their average claim cost
was four times higher than that of other physicians
($46,239 vs $11,390) [45]. Despite the increased costs,
medical care provided through workers’ compensation
leads to poor medical results after surgery [46,47]. In
the public health model, occupational physicians would
not be able to exclude other physicians from providing
care to their private patients.
APHA Policy Statement
The American Public Health Association (APHA)
reviewed the proposals for reform of workers’ compensa-
tion, and in 2009 gave its support to many of the ele-
ments of the Public Health Model in a Policy Statement.
The APHA called for increased research on work-related
illness and reporting methods. A national database would
lay the groundwork for research into the causes and con-
sequences of occupational illnesses, and lead to improved
diagnosis, treatment, prognosis, and ultimately, preven-
tion of occupational diseases. There should be a compre-
hensive and universal reporting system for all
occupational injuries and illnesses [48]. The APHA Policy
Statement outlined the following objectives:
• The workers’ compensation system should put pre-
vention of injury and illness, and rehabilitation of
those unable to return to work after injury and ill-
ness as its foremost goals.
• The current fragmented workers’ compensation
system should be replaced by a national program
with uniform coverage of health care and adequate
loss-of-earnings benefits for all occupational injuries
and illnesses.
• The system should be a more comprehensive, no-
fault compensation system based on disability, not
impairment, such as exists in The Netherlands,
where all employees are covered by a compulsory
government administered plan that insures against
loss of earnings from long-term disability resulting
from any occupational injury or disease.
• The system should include a national standard of
coverage for all workers, including all federal and
state government workers. Individual state exemp-
tions for seasonal agricultural workers, home care
workers, domestic workers, part-time workers, con-
tractors, immigrant workers, employees of small
companies and all other special categories should be
removed.
• The system should be integrated in a seamless
manner with the Social Security disability program
(SSDI); benefits should be provided for all perma-
nent injuries and illnesses.
• Health care for injured workers should be provided
by a national health care system independent of
industry involvement and insurance industry control;
health care providers should be removed from the
responsibility of determining eligibility for benefits.
• The system must have mandatory root cause inves-
tigation requirements for all occupational injuries
and illnesses.
• The system must have money set aside for: train-
ing of occupational health and safety professionals;
preventive initiatives based on root injury and illness
analyses; worker health and safety training; and man-
datory reporting by health professionals
• The system should provide assistance, incentives
and training in job modification and appropriate
return to work.
• Where appropriate, tort and criminal liability for
negligence should be permitted for those who know-
ingly or recklessly cause disability.
• There should be a national medical and statistical
database on worker injuries, worker illnesses, worker
toxic exposures and resultant diseases.
Conclusion
European workers’ compensation systems offer a num-
ber of important examples for redesign of workers’ com-
pensation in the United States. These examples are most
useful to the FECA program for federal employees. The
EU’s far more generous support for workers’
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compensation results in many redesign initiatives that
are not easily translated to the more serious need for
reform that exists in the United States at the state level.
The Public Health Model proposed in 2006 would abol-
ish the workers’ compensation system, and in its place
adopt a national disability insurance system for all inju-
ries and illnesses. Although a marked departure from
European workers’ compensation, the Public Health
Model would embrace the European success with physi-
cian consultation with industry and labor.
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